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Abstract In this paper, I consider a particular amoralist
challenge against those who would morally criticize our
single-player video play, viz., ‘‘come on, it’s only a game!’’
The amoralist challenge with which I engage gains strength
from two facts: the activities to which the amoralist lays
claim are only those that do not involve interactions with
other rational or sentient creatures, and the amoralist concedes that there may be extrinsic, consequentialist considerations that support legitimate moral criticisms. I argue
that the amoralist is mistaken and that there are non-consequentialist resources for morally evaluating our singleplayer game play. On my view, some video games contain
details that anyone who has a proper understanding of and
is properly sensitive to features of a shared moral reality
will see as having an incorrigible social meaning that targets groups of individuals, e.g., women and minorities. I
offer arguments to support the claim that there are such
incorrigible social meanings and that they constrain the
imaginative world so that challenges like ‘‘it’s only a
game’’ lose their credibility. I also argue that our responses
to such meanings bear on evaluations of our character, and
in light of this fact video game designers have a duty to
understand and work against the meanings of such
imagery.
Keywords Ethics  Video games  Applied ethics  Race 
Gender  Aesthetics  Virtual pedophilia
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Single-player video game play and the challenge
of amoralism
To the extent that our game play puts us in contact with
agents who are either rational or sentient, it is the proper
subject of moral evaluation. Such contact might be made
when one plays a multiplayer game,1 when one purchases
game currency or goods from a ‘‘gold farm,’’2 or when one
purchases a game from a company with a poor environmental record. While in each of these situations there are
considerations that clearly place our activities within the
scope of the moral, my focus here is exclusively on our
single-player video game play itself. In this more narrow
context, one might be tempted to conclude that our activities are not within the scope of the moral because there are
no salient moral considerations to speak of. To see this
point more forcefully, consider that with the exception of
the player herself, the characters that populate singleplayer game worlds are neither rational nor sentient. As a
result, players can neither fail to respect them nor harm
them; at best, it seems that players can simulate disrespecting or harming creatures that are roughly like them. In
light of this, one might think that morality has very little to
say about our single-player in-game activities, and so
advocate amoralism about such game play.
Amoralism in such a narrowly circumscribed context
has a few virtues. First, it can accommodate our ordinary
moral judgments in a wide-range of cases. For example, we
might think it odd to claim that it is immoral to enjoy
simulating shooting one’s enemies while playing No One
Lives Forever, even though we might think that enjoying
actually shooting one’s enemies would expose a flaw in our
1
2

Raiter and Warner (2005).
Ibid.
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character. Similarly, we might think it odd were someone
recommended to us as a person of noble character on the
basis of her treatment of her citizens in Civilization III. We
can think of countless number of similar assessments,
assessments that would be perfectly cogent in a real world
context but would be misplaced in the context of a singleplayer video game. Second, once we recognize that widening the context of our activity to include our interactions
with actual sentient and rational creatures places our
activities squarely in the realm of the moral, this narrow
form of amoralism appears less radical. For example,
amoralism about single-player video game play is consistent with a substantive moral theory of MMOGs. Third, a
commitment to amoralism even in this narrow context does
not entail a wholesale rejection of evaluation of our singleplayer video game play. It is open to the amoralist to point
out that there are non-moral gamer values or virtues that
are expressive of playing well, though what it means to
play well will be made sense of in distinctly non-moral
terms.
Still, the representational content of at least some video
games strikes many of us as especially morally worrisome,
despite their apparent fictionality. Consider, for example,
that in playing the game Custer’s Revenge we are asked to
navigate a representation of General Custer through a hail
of arrows toward a target that is a representation of a
naked, Native-American woman who is tied to a pole. If we
successfully reach our target, then our reward is that our
character—Custer—simulates a rape of the Native-American character as our point total rises. Certainly, it seems,
morality must have something interesting to say about this
game. One way to resolve the apparent tension between the
amoralist challenge and our intuitions about games like
Custer’s Revenge is to point to indirect harms that can
result from enjoying even simulations of activities like
rape. In this spirit, one might cite evidence to support the
claim that playing Custer’s Revenge makes us more violent, insensitive, rash, sexist, or racist. If challenges of this
sort can be sustained, we have a compelling, though
extrinsic, reason to avoid playing at least some video
games—a reason that even the amoralist will have to
concede. After all, if fictional activities have real-world
ramifications, then there is no reason to deny the legitimacy
of such considerations. What the amoralist must deny is
that there are legitimate intrinsic grounds for moral
assessment of such activities. It is this claim that I aim to
undermine here. I think that there are also legitimate
intrinsic moral reasons to avoid playing video games like
Custer’s Revenge that can be illuminated by adopting a
virtue-theoretic perspective. On my view, some video
games contain details that anyone who has a proper
understanding of and is properly sensitive to features of a
shared moral reality will see as having an incorrigible
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social meaning that targets groups of individuals, in this
case women and minorities. I offer arguments to support
the claim that there are such incorrigible social meanings
and that they constrain the imaginative world so that
challenges like ‘‘it’s only a game’’ lose their credibility. I
also argue that our responses to such meanings bear on
evaluations of our character, and in light of this fact video
game designers have a duty to understand and work against
the meanings of such imagery.3 If I am right, then even a
very narrowly constrained amoralism—amoralism about
intrinsic, evaluative considerations—ought to be rejected.

Virtual wrongs and their consequences for virtue
Some video game ethicists who adopt a virtue ethical
perspective focus on the benefits and harms that accrue to a
player’s character via her game play. For example, in an
attempt to show that the mere fictionality of a video game
is insufficient to push it out of the realm of the moral, Matt
McCormick argues that it would be morally wrong for
someone to use a virtual reality suite to engage in virtualpedophilia, virtual-genocide, or virtual-rape because by
‘‘participating in simulations of excessive, indulgent, and
wrongful acts, we are cultivating the wrong sort of character…you do harm to yourself in that you erode your
virtue, and you distance yourself from your goal of eudaimonia.’’4 In an effort to extend McCormick’s analysis,
Mark Coeckelbergh argues that ‘‘[t]he moral problem,
then, is not so much with committing virtual moral acts as
such, but with doing that repeatedly, with training these
acts.’’5 In a similar vein, Monique Wonderly argues that
the ‘‘problem with [violent video] games is that they may
damage our empathetic faculties, and in so doing, they may
be directly harming our centers of moral judgment.’’6 Miquel Sicart claims that ‘‘[w]hen defining the player as a
virtuous being, I use the Aristotelian concept of practical
wisdom, or phronesis, to refer to how a player determines
which choices can further develop her virtues as a player.’’7
Insofar these theorists treat the having of a proper character
as the end of action, as something to be maximized, promoted, or aimed at in some way they appear to endorse a
version of virtue-consequentialism.
However, the trend amongst contemporary virtue theorists is to interpret virtue theory primarily as moral theory
3

Hereafter, I shall refer to ‘single-player video game play’ by the
less cumbersome ‘game play,’ though throughout I focus only on this
narrow range of video game activities, unless I note otherwise.
4
McCormick (2001).
5
Coeckelbergh (2007).
6
Wonderly (2008).
7
Sicart (2009).
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that emphasizes the source of an action understood in terms
of virtuous traits of character, rather than the consequences
that accrue to one’s character.8 Despite a fair amount of
disagreement amongst virtue theorists over exactly how to
specify the relationship between the virtues and right
action, virtue theorists tend to agree that an action is right if
and only if it is expressive of virtue. So, for example, an
action will be wrong if all-things-considered it is expressive of cruelty, and right if it is all-things-considered
expressive of kindness. Though virtue theorists certainly
care about cultivating a proper character, and so will care
about the kinds of considerations that are raised in much of
the ethics literature on video games that focuses on the
virtues, such concerns are not the primary focus of virtue
theory. What is particularly attractive about virtue theory
for my purposes is that it provides non-consequential
resources for assessing the moral status of our in-game
activities, resources that I avail myself of in this project. To
help illustrate this point, let us again consider McCormick’s example of virtual pedophilia. In a case like this
one, our moral disgust is not aimed at the virtual pedophile’s wanton disregard for the health of her character as
McCormick’s analysis suggests. Instead, it is aimed at the
current status of her character. There must be something
wrong, antecedently, with anyone who would engage in
such an activity for pleasure, independent of the consequences that might accrue to herself or others.9 If you are
skeptical of this point, I invite you to imagine what you
would think of your friend should you find her coming out
of the virtual reality suite announcing ‘‘I just had great time
in there. You can even have sex with virtual children. But
hey, no worries, they aren’t real.’’ Assuming that we did
not have prior knowledge of our friend’s virtual-exploits, I
think that it is safe to say that for most of us our attitude
toward our friend would be significantly diminished. This
person cannot be the person that we thought she was. In
some cases, we might even think that our friend’s willingness or ability to engage in such an activity is a reason
to end the friendship altogether. It would not be that we
were worried that such behavior would make our friend a
worse person, though it might and this is certainly a morally salient consideration. More to the point, however, we

8

See, for example, Rosalind Hursthouse’s seminal articulation and
defense of virtue theory. Hursthouse (1999).
9
If our judgments can be sustained in such a case, this suggests that
there are resources for moral criticism of the virtual pedophile even if
there is little reason to support the claim that such activities harm
actual children as Neil Levy argues. See, Levy (2002). Further, it
suggests that there are resources for moral criticism even if, contra
Levy, virtual pedophilia harms virtually no one as Peter Singer
argues. See, Singer (2007).
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would worry that our friend is a worse person than we
thought she was. Anyone who would do that must be.10

Virtual wrongs and non-consequential assessment
A guiding case: Custer’s Revenge
What exactly does the virtual-pedophilia case establish?
Minimally, I think that it establishes that some activities
that are aimed at fictional entities and so are in some sense
simulated, expose a flaw in the agent’s character: a virtuous
agent would not undertake such an activity for the sake of
pleasure, sexual or otherwise. So, it at least makes room for
the possibility that our game play, fictionalized as it is,
might also be expressive of a flaw in our character. Still, it
is not clear how to move from this highly particularized
case to general claims about the morality of single-player
video game play. This is so because we do not have a clear
picture of what exactly has gone wrong with the virtual
pedophile. To make further progress in this area, we need
to know two things. First, when are our video game
activities expressive of our character? Second, in what way
are they so expressive? In an attempt to help answer these
questions, let us consider the following scenario: your
friend asks you to play the game that I mentioned at the
outset of this essay, Custer’s Revenge.11 The goal of
Custer’s Revenge, your friend explains, is to save another
character that is held captive. As you begin to play, you
notice two things. First, your character, General Custer, is
under attack by a hail of arrows shot by native-Americans.
Second, the character that you are to save is a nativeAmerican woman who is unclothed and tied to a pole.
While you worry about the possible racial and gender
insensitivity of this game, you continue playing.12 After all,
you reason, it’s only a game and you do not want to get into
it with your friend. However, when you navigate Custer
through the onslaught of arrow attacks to reach your target,
10

Morgan Luck argues that in some cases virtual pedophilia might
lead to a reduction in harm. I agree that in a case in which virtual
pedophilia is a necessary means to preventing actual pedophilia, it
seems that all-things-considered the pedophile ought to engage in
virtual pedophilia. Nevertheless, I think that such an activity exposes
a substantive flaw in the pedophile’s character. Virtuous agents would
not need such cathartic experiences. See, Luck (2009).
11
Custer’s Revenge was released in 1982 for Atari by Mystique, a
company that produced a number of video games with graphic sexual
content.
12
Phillip Brey argues that ‘‘[t]he principal moral importance of
[representations that are biased] is that they may induce false or
biased beliefs in users that may ultimately have undesirable practical
consequences.’’ Brey (1999). While Brey may be right, the line of
reasoning that I am pursuing here is a distinctly non-consequential
one.
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you find that part of your/Custer’s reward is to ‘‘rape’’ the
native-American woman.13
I suspect that many of us would be somewhat puzzled to
find ourselves put in such a position, especially by someone
that we take to be our friend. Of obvious significance here
is that Custer’s Revenge invites us to be entertained by part
of the game’s reward, a representation of a rape of a
Native-American woman. We might initially consider that
our friend is only pulling our leg, or trying to make a moral
point. But, after having ruled out such explanations, I think
that many of us would feel compelled to say something to
our friend about the way in which this game makes us
morally uneasy. We should not, it seems, enjoy representations like that. Still, if upon voicing our unease, our
friend responded to our complaint by claiming ‘‘hey, come
on, it’s only a game. You know that I am not a racist or
sexist.’’ to merely insist that we should not enjoy representations like that seems, if not unconvincing, certainly
unilluminating. Moreover, this challenge is made more
difficult by the fact that many games contain representations of immorality that are not similarly morally worrisome. For example, setting aside the issue of the effects
that playing games might have on those who play them, I
doubt that most of us would find much of the violent
content that we find in the average first-person shooter,
fictionalized as it is, morally troubling per se.14 We might
find such games juvenile, or in bad taste, or even boring,
but not morally objectionable. Further, it will not do to
point out that in playing Custer’s Revenge it is we who
enact the wrong represented and this is morally relevant,15
since many games that are not morally troubling also invite
us to do this.
What I want to know then is what it is about a game like
Custer’s Revenge that makes it morally worrisome, given
that many other games contain representations of immorality that are not. This is the crux of the matter: on what
grounds can we say that it is permissible to enjoy some
representations of immorality, but not others? In what
follows, I quickly consider one possible solution to the
‘‘it’s only a game’’ challenge that I think is unsatisfactory
because it fails to take seriously the reasonable thought that
sometimes being fictional makes a moral difference. Still,
this view does provide us guidance insofar as it opens up
13

Strictly speaking, in the actual game Custer simulates sexual
intercourse with the native-American woman while she is still tied to
the pole, though I doubt many will have difficultly conceiving of this
as a depiction of rape.
14
I do not mean to deny that there are legitimate consequential
considerations that one might cite here. I only intend to set these
matters aside in order to expose a different kind of moral evaluation
that has been underexplored.
15
For an argument that in-game activities are our activities see
Vellemen (2008).
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the possibility that even in fictional contexts, our attitudinal
responses say something morally important about the kind
of person that we are. In the final section, I suggest a way
of thinking about these kinds of characterological evaluations that is non-consequential and sensitive to context.
Fictional activities and actual attitudes
One might respond to the ‘‘it’s only a game’’ challenge by
pointing out that when we play video games we experience
emotions and other attitudinal states that are not fictional.
For example, often when we play video games we are
amused, happy, frustrated, dissatisfied, and even on occasion mortified. We do not merely pretend to experience
such emotional attitudes. Some philosophers have argued
that the fact that our attitudes and emotions are not feigned
suggests that they are expressive of our actual commitments, moral and otherwise.16 As Berys Gaut puts the point
in another context,
I can criticize someone for taking pleasure in others’
pain, for being amused by sadistic cruelty, for being
angry at someone when she has done no wrong, for
desiring the bad. The same is true when responses are
directed at fictional events, for these responses are
actual, not just imagined ones.17
On Gaut’s view, we should not respond positively to a
morally negative scene and vice versa, regardless of the
ontological status of subjects of the scene. If our attitudinal
responses to video games are expressive of our actual
commitments, then we are subject to a straightforward kind
of moral appraisal in light these attitudes. That is, our
attitudes and emotions are subject to roughly the same
moral evaluation in fictional contexts as in actual contexts.
So, just as we can be morally criticized for finding an
instance of racial injustice amusing, we can be criticized
for enjoying the unseemly content in Custer’s Revenge.
One virtue of views like these is that they provide a
compelling explanation of the wrongness of virtual-pedophilia. It is exceedingly difficult to imagine an agent that
enjoys virtual pedophilia but does not have unseemly
sexual urges toward children, however weak. But, how
well does this account make sense of our friend’s response
to Custer’s Revenge? Certainly, it is possible that our
friend’s enjoyment is expressive of his unsavory attitudes
towards women, minorities, or both, despite his protestations otherwise. After all, we are not always in the best
position to know our own moral commitments. But, what if
we have no other evidence to suggest that he is racist or
sexist except his enjoyment of Custer’s Revenge? Are we
16
17

See, for example, Gaut (2002) and Walton (1997).
Gaut, ibid.
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prepared to infer from this single instance that our friend is
wrong about his own attitudes, and in fact he does have
racist and/or sexist attitudes? Certainly, if we notice a
pattern of attitudinal responses, then the strength of such an
inference would increase. But, if we are to accept this view,
then we must also accept the immediate inference from the
fact that our friend’s enjoyment is aimed at this morally
worrying representational content to the claim that he is
either racist, sexist, or both. At the very least, I think that
many readers will be uneasy about the supposed immediacy of such an inference. Still, even those of us who might
be willing to countenance such a failing in even this case,
would likely be unwilling to make a similar inference in
any number of structurally similar cases.18 Consider, for
example, the game Mafia Wars. The fact that we enjoy this
game seems to say nothing all by itself about our moral
attitude toward organized crime, just as our enjoyment of
Farmville likely says nothing about our attitude toward
farming. This is not to say that the attitudes and emotions
that we experience in video game contexts never say
anything morally interesting about us, I think that they do.
My only claim here is that in many cases they do not, or at
least not in the way that this family of views requires.
Insofar as such views commit us to the claim that as a
matter of course they do, they represent an over-moralizing
of our video game play.19
Still, as I suggested earlier, I think that Gaut is right that
our intentional attitudes even in imaginative contexts are
the proper subject of moral evaluation. Where he has gone
wrong is in thinking that the fact that an attitude is mobilized in an imaginative context never makes a moral difference. It does. The cases offered above support this point.
What we need then is to think more carefully about the
kinds of non-consequential considerations that are morally
salient for determining if we should play a particular firstperson video game for fun. In what follows, I offer an
account of some such considerations. I argue in a step-wise
fashion that some otherwise imaginative representations,
including those that we find in video games, have what I
call incorrigible social meanings. These meanings operate
to limit the range of reasonable interpretations of fictionalized representations, so that anyone who has a proper
understanding of and is properly sensitive to particular
features of the moral landscape will see some video game
representations as having an incorrigible social meaning
that raises the moral stakes and opens the door to
18

For a more substantive argument against the Gautian line of
argument, see Patridge (2008).
19
Mia Consalvo makes a related point. She argues that we cannot
simply bring our intuitions about what would be right and wrong in
the actual world directly to bear on the world of games, though her
focus is on a different phenomenon: in-game cheating. Consalvo
(2005).
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associated character assessments. In the final section, I
offer an argument in support of incorrigibility in certain
contexts, and then consider how my view can shed light on
other video game controversies. Still, I do not think that the
considerations that I present here are the only considerations that are morally salient, nor do I think that it follows
that all-things-considered we should not enjoy playing any
game with the kinds of representational details that I point
out. That is, I do not here provide an ethics of video games,
or even an ethics of single-player video game play. I think
that the phenomena involved are far too complicated for
such a project to be successful. My goal is to demonstrate
that single-player game play itself, independent of the
consequences of such game play, is open to moral
assessment.

Incorrigible social meaning and imaginative
representations
Let us begin with what I take to be an uncontroversial
claim: imaginative representations can be more or less
fictive or imaginative. We come to imaginative worlds
armed with a host of background assumptions that are
drawn from our knowledge of the actual world. For
example, a fictional narrative might invite us to imagine
that Barack Obama travels back in time to stop global
climate change. In such a case, we are expected to bring
our knowledge of the real Obama to the act of imagining,
but to be epistemically flexible about such knowledge.
Here epistemic flexibility requires that we be prepared to
imagine that Obama is other than he is, namely that he has
the property of having traveled in time to stop global climate change.
Epistemic flexibility, however, does not require complete epistemic openness. Sometimes we are justified in
refusing to countenance an imaginative representation. For
example, we might reasonably reject an otherwise imaginative representation because it does not cohere with our
assumptions about folk psychology when, for example, we
complain that ‘‘no real person would act like that.’’
Even stronger, sometimes we ought to reject an imaginative representation all-things-considered. To see this
point, let us begin by considering that in some cases an
otherwise imaginative representation is best understood as
a critique of a real-world target. For example, the image of
Obama going back in time to stop global climate change
might act as a critique of his ‘‘god-like image.’’ I take this
point to be largely obvious, and uncontroversial. Moreover,
insofar as imaginative imagery makes a comment about an
actual person, it can be evaluated not only in terms of its
aesthetic achievement, but also in terms of its accuracy.
Again, I take this point to be uncontroversial. We might
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even find that an imaginative representation’s accuracy,
moral or otherwise, bears on its aesthetic achievement, say
when we find a political cartoon hilarious because ‘‘it is so
true.’’ In other cases, however, the thing to do might be to
reject an imaginative representation on moral grounds. To
help illustrate this point, let us consider a cartoon image of
Obama eating watermelon. In the context of the contemporary United States, such an image is properly interpreted
as a racial insult. This is so because images like this have
what I call an incorrigible social meaning. The meaning is
incorrigible in that it is exceedingly difficult to overturn,
and it is social in that this difficulty is explained by facts
about a particular social reality.
How does indentifying the incorrigible social meaning of
images help us to see the racist meaning of the cartoon of
Obama eating watermelon? The United States has a peculiar
history of slavery and racism, and images of individuals of
African descent who are eating watermelon have played a
significant part in this history. Primarily, these kinds of
images have been used as a mechanism to insult and
dehumanize African-Americans, and to bind racist Americans together through the practice of telling raciallydemeaning jokes. While the United States has made significant progress to overcome its racist past, racism is still a
concern of paramount moral importance for the United
States. That this kind of imagery has such an ignoble history, conjoined with the current reality of racism in the
United States serves to stubbornly fix the meaning of the
Obama cartoon. As a result, it would be very difficult for
someone to use this kind of imagery in contemporary
American culture in a way that avoids, or undermines its
racist meaning. Such an interpretation would be, and it
seems it ought to be, the first that occurs to those who are
aware of this history. Even if the image’s author were to
claim that the image was not meant to be interpreted as a
racist insult but as a compliment, those who are adequately
aware of the history of this kind of imagery and adequately
sensitive to the current plight of African Americans will
refuse to see the image as the author intends, even while
recognizing that the author’s intentions were otherwise.
Thus, there are limitations on what counts as a reasonable
interpretation of such imagery. The author ought to have
been aware of the incorrigible social meaning of this
imagery, and if we are to take her at her word she is at best
guilty of negligence. The same goes for a video game in
which we are to navigate a representation of Obama through
a watermelon patch. North-American audience members, at
least, ought to see the meaning of this imagery as limited by
their shared social-reality, and so see it as conveying a racist
message. So, not only does epistemic flexibility not require
epistemic openness, but even stronger, sometimes we ought
to remain epistemically closed to certain interpretative
possibilities because of moral facts on the ground.
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None of this is to say that it would be impossible to
undermine the meaning of imagery like this; certainly it is
possible to do so. However, I suspect that just about any
successful alteration of the meaning of Obama eating
watermelon in the United States will be one that uses this
kind of racist trope to make a distinctly anti-racist message.
If I am right, then the range of possible meanings here is
quite restricted because of the image’s incorrigible social
meaning. As a result, an author cannot simply employ such
imagery to mean anything that she wants, nor can an
audience member simply ignore the social meaning of such
imagery.
Insofar as the incorrigibility of a representation is often
contingent on social facts it is often, though not always,
socially local. In another cultural context, images of
Obama eating watermelon are unlikely to be properly
interpreted as racially insulting. The particular insult that is
raised by the particular image of Obama eating watermelon
is culturally specific, and culturally contingent; in another
cultural context it may be incomprehensible, or even a
compliment. What this means is that the exact same image
in a different cultural context will have a meaning that may
be quite different and perhaps less incorrigible than its
meaning in the context of the contemporary United States.
So, determining if we should reject an imaginative image
then might mean knowing quite a bit about the cultural
context in which the image is deployed. Readers who find
this series of examples mysterious because they are unaware of the social meaning that images of individuals of
African descent who are eating watermelon have in the
culture of United States are invited to consider images that
have a similar kind of incorrigible social meaning that is
local to their own cultural context. For example, a cartoon
in which Obama is simianized probably has an incorrigible
social meaning that is less local than an image of him
eating watermelon. I have no doubt that all of us can
construct many examples of imaginative representations
that have such incorrigible social meanings. However, we
should not infer from the fact that the meaning of certain
images is made incorrigible by socially local facts that
moral relativism follows. It does not. Consider the following general moral claim: racial oppression is morally
pernicious, and we should not enjoy images that support
such oppression. My claim is only that which particular
images support such oppression will often be culturally
local, and hence contingent. The general moral claim,
however, is not. I offer a more substantive moral argument
in the next section.
At this point, one might wonder what any of this has to
do with actual video games played by actual gamers. After
all, my motivating example, that of Barack Obama eating
watermelon, is morally offensive because it targets a real
person and so is to some extent not fictive or imaginative.
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Further, one might object that in many cases video game
designers create fictional worlds that do not depict any real
persons, and so the connection between the representation
and reality that I rely on here does not obtain in the context
of single-player video games, or at least not for the most
part. But, I think that this worry paints too easy a gloss on
what I think is a very complicated phenomenon. Consider,
for example, that sometimes imaginative representations do
not pick out any particular person, but nevertheless pick
out groups of people. The depiction of Obama eating
watermelon, for example, targets not just Obama, but the
entire African-American community and perhaps all individuals of African descent. If the person depicted in the
cartoon were not Obama but instead were a fictional
African American, the image would still be racially
insulting, even to Obama since Obama belongs to the group
that the image targets. So, the fact that a single-player
video game does not depict an actual person does not all by
itself push such game play beyond the reach of my
analysis.

Incorrigible social meanings and moral evaluation
Once we acknowledge that the social meaning of an
otherwise imaginative representation can, in some cases,
constrain our interpretation (this is the incorrigibility bit),
we can see a way to make sense of the ethical assessment
of single-player video game play that does not depend on
the consequences of such game play. To help illustrate this,
let us consider again the case of our friend’s enjoyment of
Custer’s Revenge. As I argued earlier, the mere fact that
our friend enjoys playing Custer’s Revenge does not tell us
very much about what to make of him morally. I think that
there are at least three possible ways in which enjoyment
here can signal a failing of character. First, as I mentioned
earlier, his enjoyment might be an expression of unsavory
attitudes, however inchoate. That is, our friend might be a
racist or sexist despite his protestations otherwise. If this
were true then it is a good bet that he enjoys the racist or
sexist imagery for precisely this reason. Similarly, one’s
enjoyment of the cartoon of Obama eating watermelon
might be best explained by the fact that one is racist. Still,
as I said earlier, I accept that enjoying Custer’s Revenge
may not directly implicate one’s moral attitudes. So, for the
sake of argument, I will put this possibility to the side.
Second, it might be that our friend does not recognize that
these images have incorrigible social meanings. Some of
my students, for example, are unaware of the social
meaning that images of African-Americans eating watermelon have in the United States, because they are unaware
of the history of this imagery. This kind of failing may be
an epistemic failing, and may even be a moral failing
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assuming that we can make the case for the claim that we
have a moral duty to know certain social facts. But,
assuming that our friend knows how sexism and racism
have played themselves out in the context of the contemporary United States, we can set this failing to the side as
well. However, in setting these two kinds of failings aside,
I do not mean to underplay the importance of such failings,
and I am not denying that for any particular case that either
of these failings provides the proper explanation. They
might. It is just that they are not central for establishing
what I am interested in here. My interest here is in
responding to a different and possibly more challenging
case: the gamer who does not have explicit, unsavory
moral attitudes; one who knows the relevant social facts,
but who fails to see why he shouldn’t enjoy the game. It is
this failing that is expressed by the challenge ‘‘Come on,
it’s only a game. You know I’m not racist or sexist.’’ Is
there anything that we can say to our friend to convince
him that he ought not to enjoy representations like that,
even if his enjoyment is not a direct reflection of unsavory
moral attitudes? I think so, and I think that attending to the
incorrigible social meaning of such imagery can help us see
our way to a cogent moral criticism of our friend’s
enjoyment of Custer’s Revenge. In such a case, it might be
that our friend fails to see social meanings as incorrigible.
To help see the aforementioned possibility let us consider again the cartoon of Obama eating watermelon.
Assuming that the proper interpretation of the political
cartoon is one that invites its audience to find the image of
Obama eating watermelon amusing or in some way enjoyable, then it invites its audience to share in a racist joke or
comment. Americans, it seems, ought not to find this cartoon amusing. This is true whether the author recognizes it
or not. The same goes for the video game in which one is to
navigate a representation of Obama or any representation of
an individual who appears to be of African descent through
a watermelon patch. American gamers ought not to enjoy
such representations, and similarly ought to refuse to see
through these representations to the game mechanics. Such
representations call for explicit rejection.
Similarly, the imagery of Custer’s Revenge is worrisome
at least in part because it targets women and Native
Americans. In the actual world, women are the victims of a
kind of systematic oppression that involves seeing them in
certain kinds of ways, conceiving of them as certain kinds
of creatures, and subjecting them to certain kinds of violence. Given this shared moral reality, it does not take
much to see the representation of the female characters in
this game as an extension of real-world moral phenomena,
whatever the avowed intentions of the game designers, in
the same way that the image of Obama eating watermelon
is an extension of real-world racial phenomena. The game
invites us to enjoy representations of women as objects of
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sexual violence in a way that does not undermine the
morally worrisome social meaning of these images. In the
United States, Native American women have the highest
rate of rape of any other group of women; it is estimated
that nearly 1 in 3 Native American women will be raped in
her lifetime.20 Further, rape has traditionally been used as a
tool of war and oppression against women. Given the
history of the treatment of both Native Americans and
women in the United States such an image cannot help but
reference this history.
Still, we can imagine that our friend recognizes all this,
and still responds ‘‘come on, it’s only a game.’’ Is there
anything else we can say about why the meaning of this
particular imagery is socially incorrigible while other
representations of immorality are not? Though I do not
hold out much hope for anything like a decision procedure
here—in fact, I think that such determinations might in
some cases be quite difficult, and that we will find that we
have quite a bit of disagreement—it is worth pointing out
that the kind of contextual details that are in play in the
cases that I have mentioned are details about egregious,
long-term, systematic denials of justice that are of a particular kind: oppression. Oppression is especially insidious
because it denies individuals the respect that is due to one
qua human. To be accorded access to resources for seeing
oneself as fully human, rather than as subhuman, it is
necessary to live a fully human life. Moreover, this is a
need that, in the words of David Wiggins, ‘‘cannot be
satisfied by one’s own efforts.’’21 Since it is others who
deny them this dignity, it is others who must accord them
this dignity. The fact that it is our shared social history, and
it is we collectively (in these cases white Americans, or
males as the case may be) who have denied individuals full
access to such resources. Moreover, this denial has been
achieved partly through the kinds of imaginative entertaining that the games in question invite us to adopt. This is
what makes the images cited here particularly incorrigible,
so that a friend who responds to our criticism of Custer’s
Revenge by claiming, ‘‘Come on, it’s only a game; I’m not
sexist.’’ sees his imagining as just some random imagery
detached from his own moral commitments, and detached
from the moral facts on the ground. Such a failure is a
failure both of sensitivity and of sympathy—sensitivity to
the social meaning of the imagery, and sympathy with
those who are the targets of such imagery. Sympathy
requires us to inhabit the perspective of others, and to fail
to see these representations as targeting others is to fail to
adequately exhibit a properly sympathetic response in
relation to a feature of current life that especially calls for
sympathy; in this case, oppression. Sympathy in this
20
21
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context without a proper understanding of the social relevance of these images is no sympathy at all. As a result,
one has the added duty to be cognizant of the incorrigible
social meanings of these depictions. To pretend otherwise
is to be tone deaf to an obvious feature of our moral reality.
So, even if our friend does not have explicitly racist or
sexist attitudes sufficient to justify the charge of racism or
sexism, something has gone wrong with his attitudinal
responses. He lacks a sensitivity to the meaning of this kind
imagery and as a result fails to recognize the limitations of
the imaginative content. To insist that one’s imagination is
one’s own private affair, detached from one’s own actual
commitments and similarly detached from the contextual
moral facts on the ground, amounts minimally, in this case,
to a thumbing of one’s nose at a requirement of solidarity
with the victims of oppression. This is an obvious vice of
character. So, it seems that minimally our friend is guilty of
being racially and sexually insensitive.
Does attending properly to the incorrigible social
meaning of imaginative representations avoid the problem
of over-moralizing our game play? I think that it does. In
many cases, the representational violence that we find in
video games is presented so that it does not directly
implicate our shared, moral reality. Though, on my view
this is a contextual matter, and so in some contexts it
might. As a result, the images lack an incorrigible social
meaning and as a result are more interpretively flexible.
We are often shooting aliens, or spies, or members of a
competing faction. Whatever we are doing in these games
is sufficiently insulated from our shared, moral reality so as
to make the challenge ‘‘Come on, it’s only a game!’’ a
credible one. It is this insulation from the real world that
makes the kind of associated character evaluations like
‘‘See how she has defended the citizens against the
aggressive attack of the space aliens; she is certainly a good
person.’’ misplaced. But, as morally challenging representational content begins to reflect our actual, shared
history of systematic moral violations like gender or racial
oppression, this serves to limit the meaning of such
imagery, and thereby open the door for associated character
evaluations. One who enjoys playing games like Custer’s
Revenge may not be sexist, but still may lack the appropriate sensitivity to sexism. Such a lack of sensitivity might
be a failure to see the relationship between the game’s
representation of members of an oppressed class and the
actual oppression of such individuals, or it might be a
failure to see such a connection as a reason to avoid
enjoying such a representation. However we make sense of
the particular failing of a particular player, the evaluative
difference between the run-of-the-mill first-person shooter
and games like Custer’s Revenge is often best explained by
the kind of representational wrong that the game invites us
to enjoy. This is not to say that all-things-considered the
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game is not worthy of being played, it might be. My only
claim here is that even when we determine that a game
with morally worrisome content is worthy of being played,
a virtuous gamer will refuse to enjoy the offending content
because such content will bring to mind real-world, moral
conditions. Similarly, such a gamer will at the very least
refuse to see seamlessly through the representational content to the game mechanics on moral grounds. Such
meanings demand our attention even if all-things-considered we determine that the representational wrong is slight
enough to ignore for the sake of the game.
Further, attending to the incorrigible social meanings of
video game imagery can help shed light on some other
criticisms that have been raised against video games.
Consider, for example, that these kinds of considerations
are at least part of what bothers many about the prostitute
scenario in Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas in which the
gamer can procure the services of a prostitute only to kill
her and take his money back, and the general sexualized
representations of female characters in most video games.
In the case of video game representations of women, part
of why it is reasonable to see such imagery as representations of actual women is that they are nearly universally
sexualized. This imagery has a meaning that is fixed by the
actual practice of casting women in the role of objects of
sexual pleasure and violence. I think that the same can be
said of the notorious game RapeLay.
Further, it can help shed light on some current debates
over games like Resident Evil 5.22 Of particular worry is
that the game’s main character, Chris, is portrayed as a
white westerner who must kill scores of African zombies.
The image of Chris ‘‘unloading his pistol into hordes of
African zombies’’23 has a meaning that is contingent on the
actual history of the colonization of Africa by westerners,
so that an image of a white man shooting black Africans
ought to bring to mind this troubling history. Moreover, the
fact that black Africans are represented as zombies here
raises another worry. The particular history of racial
oppression of Africans involves stereotyping them as
subhuman, a fact that gives the images in a game that
portrays most of its subhuman characters, zombies, as
African, a meaning that is fixed by this history. As a result,
playing Resident Evil 5 puts many gamers in the position of
enjoying a representation that just about any reasonable
interpretation of which involves the reality of racial
oppression. Just as the meaning of the image of the Obama
eating watermelon is fixed by the history of racial
oppression in the United States, the meaning of images of
Africans as subhuman targets is fixed by a more global
history of colonization and racial oppression.
22
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One might object that in Resident Evil 5 the social
meaning of the offending imagery has been adequately
undermined by the game designers, viz. there is a perfectly
good reason for representing the zombies as African, since
the game is set in Africa. Moreover, one might continue,
the goal of the game is not to kill as many African zombies
as you can, it is to save African villages, the continent of
Africa, and even the world from a bio-terrorist group that
has used a virus to turn Africans into zombies. Since the
mission itself is a noble one by real-world standards, it is in
the interest of most Africans, and since the action takes
place in Africa, and since the real enemies are not the
zombies but bio-terrorists, the otherwise problematic
imagery is taken into account, and rendered morally neutral.24 As a result, it is reasonable to claim that the game
designers have taken some measures to undermine the
incorrigible meaning of images of white western males
killing sub-human Africans.
I concede that an imaginative representation of African
zombies could be employed in a way that is far less sensitive to the social meaning of such imagery. Still, given
the history of racial oppression and colonization perpetrated by western countries against African nations, the
depiction of characters as being of African descent and
sub-human ought to bring to mind this actual history which
involves in no small part the dehumanization of those of
African descent. While one might not unreasonably make
the claim that this kind of imagery harms those of African
descent, this is not the claim that I am making here. My
claim is only that it is in light of these histories that some
images have an incorrigible meaning that game designers
and gamers alike have a duty to take seriously, and it is at
least an open question whether or not the designers of
Resident Evil 5 have done so adequately. I think that they
have not. Still, even if the game ultimately avoids the
particular criticisms that I have here raised against it, it is
clear that these are the kinds of considerations with which
game designers and gamers must contend. In a globalized
marketplace, game designers have a substantive moral duty
to understand the incorrigible social meanings of the representations that they employ, which means that they have
a duty to understand the cultures in which their products
will be marketed.
Still, one might worry that the notion of an incorrigible
social meaning does not address the issue of virtualpedophilia. How can talk about the incorrigible social
meanings of imaginative representations make sense of our
moral intuitions in a case like this? As I said at the outset,
24
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such meanings are often, though not always local. Consider, for example that the meaning of the imagery of
women that is found in most video games is likely not
local, but global: the incorrigible social meaning of images
of women is contingent on the actual, global history and
current reality of women’s oppression. In a world without
gender oppression, such images will likely lose their
incorrigible meanings. Still, the meaning of sexualized
images of children may not be contingent in this way, since
it seems clear that just about anyone who enjoys the
thought of having sex with very young children exposes a
flaw in her character and this fact does not seem to be
contingent on facts about our moral reality. It seems that
the same analysis can be given of games like RapeLay in
which gamers are invited to enjoy not only representations
of rape, but to enjoy simulating such activities. What this
shows is that at least some meanings are not so obviously
contingent on moral facts on the ground. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the meaning of this imagery is significantly
incorrigible so that anyone who wants to use sexualized
imagery of children or rape will have to work to undermine
this meaning. Still, as I mentioned earlier, the account that I
offer here is not meant to be a complete analysis of the
normativity of our single-person video game play. I think
that there may be many other moral considerations that are
salient for making moral judgments about what games we
should play, including extrinsic ones. My aim here is to
respond to the amoralist by providing a basis for making
non-consequential moral judgments about such game play,
and to do so in a way that does not over-moralize such
game play. I think that I have done that here.
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